Shared Reality Theory

https://www.researchgate.net/publication/269810512_Shared_reality_theory

Gerald Echterhoff

University of Münster

Word count: 1,006 (main text incl. references)

Acknowledgments: The preparation of this article was supported by a grant from the German Research Foundation (Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft, reference number EC 317/7-1, Principal Investigator: Gerald Echterhoff).

Abstract

Shared reality is currently understood as the product of the motivated process of experiencing a commonality of inner (mental) states with others about the world. First, an overview is provided about the main theoretical assumptions, including conditions of shared reality that have been proposed in recent theorizing. Second, the intellectual ancestry of the theory is traced back to approaches in three main areas, that is, interpersonal communication and language use, phenomenological approaches, and social influence research. Finally, the operationalization in empirical research and the applicability of the theory are outlined.

Key words: shared reality, interpersonal communication, language use, social influence, epistemic and relational motivation

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Human thinking and behavior entail socially shared realities, that is, representations about the world jointly held with others, especially with those who are familiar or close to us (Hardin & Higgins, 1996). For instance, when people meet a new employee at their workplace, they often form their impressions of the newcomer jointly with their colleagues (construction stage; see also Social Constructionism), and they feel more confident in their impressions when others agree (verification stage). Achieving a shared reality allows us to judge people or groups (see also Social Cognition), form political or religious convictions, or achieve a sense of self.

According to the recent definition (Echterhoff, Higgins, & Levine, 2009), shared reality is the product of the motivated process of experiencing a commonality of inner (mental) states (e.g., attitudes or judgments) with others about the world. It is thus conceptualized as an interpersonally achieved, subjective psychological phenomenon (see also Social Psychology). The definition encapsulates four main conditions that are assumed to underlie shared reality. First, the commonality between individuals refers to their inner states rather than just their overt behaviors. Second, shared reality is “about something”— it implies a referent or object of inner states (Higgins, 1998). Third, shared reality creation is assumed to be driven by fundamental human needs (see also Motivation), specifically the (epistemic) need for a confident understanding of the world and the (affiliative-relational) need to connect with others (Kopietz et al. 2010). The two needs are closely intertwined in the operation of shared reality. For instance, by creating a shared reality about a newcomer at work, the old team members fulfill both their epistemic need for a confident judgment and strengthen their mutual relationship. Fourth, shared reality involves the experience of being connected and having common inner (mental) states. Based on these criteria, shared reality can be distinguished from related constructs like common ground, perspective-taking, or socially distributed knowledge (Echterhoff et al., 2009).

The intellectual ancestry of shared-reality theory falls into three main areas: interpersonal communication, phenomenological approaches in philosophy and sociology, and social influence research. First, the pioneering work on shared reality by the social psychologist Tory Higgins (1981) was inspired by pragmatic approaches to language and Wittgenstein’s (1953) notion of the language game. Consistent with a pragmatic view, Higgins (1981) understands language as a social action that involves context-dependent expectations and rules concerning the interlocutors’ roles and language use, and requires the mutual consideration of each other’s characteristics (see also Language). In the communication game as conceptualized by Higgins interlocutors are assumed to follow rules such as saying what is relevant and tailoring (or “tuning”) one’s communication to the audience’s knowledge, perspective and attitudes. In subsequent work, beginning with Higgins (1992), audience tuning of communication is considered a key vehicle for communicators’ shared-reality creation with an audience.

The second theoretical tradition relevant to shared-reality theory can be found in phenomenological approaches in philosophy and sociology (see also Phenomenology). Related to the aboutness of common inner states emphasized by the theory, philosophers like Brentano (1974) argued that intentional directedness is characteristic of human thinking. This notion draws attention to the triadic relation implied by many formulations of shared reality theory, specifically the relation between one person experiencing sharing, another person or group of persons with whom the sharing is experienced, and a target referent of the sharing.

A third cornerstone of shared-reality theorizing is social influence research (see also Social Influence). Social influence is understood as the shift of an individual’s responses (e.g., behaviors or attitudes) toward the position of one or more others as a result of interaction with these others. Shared-reality theory makes distinctive assumptions about the underlying conditions and processes. For instance, the success of social influence appeals is assumed to depend on the recipient’s experience of interpersonal connectedness with the source of influence (Echterhoff, Kopietz, & Higgins, 2013).

Empirical research informed by shared-reality theory has been published only within the past ten years. When people are motivated to create a shared reality with others, they often communicate with them. Thus, empirical studies have typically employed interpersonal communication to capture antecedents, processes, and consequences of shared reality. These studies have provided evidence that is consistent with shared-reality theory. For instance, communicators are more willing to create a shared reality with an in-group audience than with an out-group audience because communication with the former is better suited to satisfying fundamental epistemic and relational needs (Echterhoff, Higgins, & Groll, 2005). The theory is potentially applicable to diverse phenomena involving the establishment and experience of reality, such as stereotyping, belief justification in close relationships, and decision-making in work teams.

References

Brentano, Franz. 1974. Psychology from an empirical standpoint (A. Rancurrello, D. Terrell, and L. McAlister, Trans.). London: Routledge and Kegan. (Original published 1874).

Echterhoff, Gerald, Edward T. Higgins, and Stephan Groll. 2005. “Audience-tuning effects on memory: The role of shared reality.” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 89: 257–276. DOI:10.1037/0022-3514.89.3.257.

Echterhoff, Gerald, Edward T. Higgins, and John M. Levine. 2009. “Shared reality: Experiencing commonality with others’ inner states about the world.” Perspectives on Psychological Science, 4: 496-521. DOI:10.1111/j.1745-6924.2009.01161.x.

Echterhoff, Gerald, Rene Kopietz, and Edward T. Higgins. 2013. “Adjusting shared reality: Communicators' memory changes as their connection with their audience changes.” Social Cognition, 31: 162-186. DOI:10.1521/soco.2013.31.2.162.

Hardin, Curtis D., and Edward T. Higgins. 1996. “Shared reality: How social verification makes the subjective objective”. In Handbook of motivation and cognition: The interpersonal context, edited by Richard M. Sorrentino, and Edward T. Higgins, 3:28–84. New York: Guilford Press.

Higgins, Edward T. 1981. “The “communication game”: Implications for social cognition and persuasion”. In Social cognition: The Ontario Symposium, edited by Edward T. Higgins, C. Peter Herman, and Mark P. Zanna, 1: 343–392. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.

Higgins, Edward T. 1992. “Achieving “shared reality” in the communication game: A social action that creates meaning.” Journal of Language and Social Psychology, 11: 107–131. DOI:10.1177/0261927X92113001.

Higgins, Edward T. 1998. “The aboutness principle: A pervasive influence on human inference.” Social Cognition, 16: 173–198. DOI:10.1521/soco.1998.16.1.173.

Kopietz, Rene, Jens H. Hellmann, Edward T. Higgins, and Gerald Echterhoff. 2010. “Shared-reality effects on memory: Communicating to fulfill epistemic needs.” Social Cognition, 28: 353-378. DOI:10.1521/soco.2010.28.3.353

Wittgenstein, Ludwig. 1953. Philosophical investigations. New York: Macmillan.

Shared Reality Theory

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